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Introduction 
 In South Africa, somewhere between 400 and 700 people were killed in the summer 
of 1976.  Many were innocent school children.  The tragedy of the Soweto Uprising shocked 
the nation and the rest of the world.  The protests were sparked over a change in education 
policy which called for all secondary education courses to be taught exclusively in Afrikaans.  
Many students and teachers who were not fluent in Afrikaans were effectively cut out of the 
education system.  Teachers were fired for ignoring the new rules and students started to 
strike.  These protests came together on June 16, 1976, when students congregated outside of 
Soweto for a peaceful protest and were subsequently shot at by the police.  This event brings 
up the importance of linguistic policy and rights in how it can lead to conflict between 
peoples.  
 Policy surrounding language use is not trivial.  Language, in modern states, is 
intrinsically tied to culture, power, and societal stability.  The changes to South Africa’s 
educational policies that sparked the Soweto Uprising were power grabs by the Afrikaners – 
an attempt to use language as a tool to further institutionalize the disenfranchisement of non-
Afrikaners.  Similar situations have occurred in many states and systems throughout the 
world. From Sri Lanka to Northern Ireland, language has played a key role in national 
identity and the internal power politics of states.  In modern times, with the increased global 
movement of people and the newfound interest in rights for previously overlooked minorities, 
the prevailing opinion around language rights has advanced towards one of acceptance for 
regional and immigrant minority groups to use their own language, at least to some degree.  
Through multinational agreements, such as Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the language rights of minorities have become a more central 
point for conversations on how states should behave. Outside of any discussion of global 
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norms, there is a serious conversation about minority language rights being a beneficial path 
for a nation’s stability through the possible reduction in ethnic violence and tension. This 
thesis investigates the influence of language rights policies on ethnic conflict in three 
Western democracies.  In this paper, I will look at how policy towards minority language 
rights and why official policy towards minority language rights in developed democracies are 
still an important factor in these states' stability.   I will look at the different effects of states 
utilizing assimilationist or maintenance policies at either the federal or regional level.  I hope 
to show in this paper that a moderate form of maintenance policy for regional minority 
languages at the regional level will reduce conflict between linguistic groups inside a nation 
the most.  
 Ethnic conflict is a broad topic, with language rights making up only a small but 
critical component.  There are two distinct ways in which language rights policy can lead to 
ethnic conflict. The first is that language differences reinforce and exacerbate the cleavages 
between ethnic groups.  Assimilationist language policies attempt to reduce these cleavages 
by unifying people under a single language.  However, the denial of language rights to a 
minority group can exacerbate conflict by increasing the psychological distance between 
identity groups and giving one group a cause for grievances against another. Second is the 
structural power balance that language policy can create.  This structural power balance, in 
this case, would be the structural advantages people of one linguistic group would gain over 
another if the government was to only function in a single language or had restrictions on a 
linguistic group in the nation that would bar them from opportunity.  The policy changes that 
led to the Soweto Uprising continued to reinforce the structural power imbalance between the 
Afrikaners and the other linguistic groups of South Africans. In this case, language policy 
itself can become a source of political conflict because of the political and social power it 
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confers upon groups. Both of these factors help to explain why language policy is a key 
factor in the stability of a nation.   
 There are tangible and emotional aspects of culture tied to language, so people are not 
quick to give up a native language simply to assimilate.  As groups try to negotiate a more 
unified society by removing divisions such as language differences, there is often resistance 
from the ethnic groups who want to retain pieces of their cultural heritage as they attempt to 
assimilate.  In the case of France the utilitarian nature of its assimilationist linguistic policy 
ran against many of its minority communities, such as the Corsicans, who fought to preserve 
their culture and linguistic heritage.        
The tangible nature of the linguistic cleavages which drive groups to conflict has been 
overlooked in much of the analysis of ethnic conflicts.  Nils-Christian Bormann, Lars-Erik 
Cederman, and Manuel Vogt in their 2017 article "Language, Religion, and Ethnic Conflict" 
attempted to debunk the popularly held narrative that religion was, in effect, the greatest 
conflict-cleavage.  They presented the idea that language is, in fact, a greater divider than 
religion between groups.  In their study, they mapped out ethnic groups based on differences 
in religion and language and then looked at these groups' propensity to fight each other.  
Through this analysis, they determined that "civil wars are more likely to be fought along 
linguistic cleavages than religious ones.”1  While this study is not the exclusive theory on the 
causes of ethnic civil wars, it does present substantial evidence to support the claim that 
language plays a significant role in creating and maintaining structural and cultural divisions 
between-group which leads to ethnic conflict.   
 The other source of conflict that language policy can create is described by Moria 
Paz in her article “The Failed Promise of Language Rights: A Critique of the International 
                                                          
1
 Bormann, Nils-Christian, et al. “Language, Religion, and Ethnic Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 
61, no. 4, 2017, p. 759 
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Language Rights Regime” in which she describes debates over language rights and policy as 
“a demand for a new distribution of power against a reality of scarce resources—or, a call for 
a new political settlement in society that allocates scarce resources within a single 
economy.”2  In this argument, the debate around language rights becomes a discussion of 
power and scarcity.  Paz understands the importance of language in a group's cultural heritage 
but also looks at the additional economic costs and the problems then derived from the extra 
economic burden placed on a nation from multilingualism.  It is this conflict between the 
cultural and economic issues that becomes the larger battle for structural power in a system as 
the nation must debate these tradeoffs.   Language policy in education and government 
services serve as the fronts in these conflicts and negotiations.  In these debates’ majority 
group or group in power, are looking at how much of a society's economic resources they 
want to spend on the preservation of minority groups' languages, thus leading to conflict 
between the linguistic groups.  Conflict is here being widely defined as any clash from 
violence or just any tensions around the subject of linguistic policy.      
In this thesis, I will be looking at the role that specific language rights’ policies may 
play in the peace and stability of a nation through these contexts.  In the next section, I will 
dive into the specific policy grouping that makes up linguistic rights and how they are related 
to conflict prevention. In the following sections, there will be a series of case studies that will 
compare and contrast the various modes of linguistic policy that have been presented in this 
prologue.  These case studies include states with a variety of approaches with maintenance 
and assimilationist policies at both the federal and regional levels.  The case studies will 
include the United Kingdom, which allows and supports regional and local governments to 
give support for the maintenance of regional minority languages such as Welsh keeping their 
                                                          
2 Paz, Moria. “The Failed Promise of Language Rights: a Critique of the International Language Rights Regime.” 
Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 54, no. 1, 2013, p. 166 
 Brant 7 
 
maintenance policies territorialized.  The next case study is that of France which has a strong 
policy in support of the national French language and has seen the speakers of many regional 
minority languages rise up in either protest or violence to the restrictions.  The final case 
study is that of Canada, a nation that has entrenched its support for maintaining the minority 
French language into its federal government while allowing for the Provencal government of 
Quebec to institute assimilationist policies for the protection of the already majority French 
language.  The choice of three developed democracies is to show that policy towards 
language still remains important in developed nations.  The case studies serve to reinforce the 
ideas of the High Commissioner on National Minorities’ Oslo Recommendations that 
introduce a series of moderate and regional maintenance policies for regional minority 
languages that would lead to more stability.  I will measure the level of ethnic conflict by 
looking at modern events around minority language use in these states and any conflict that 
has come from those events.  The descriptions of the current and historical tensions facing 
these states are relevant to the discussion of language rights and to see how states have 
continually dealt with the, I hope to show that the rights presented in the moderate regional 
maintenance policies presented in documents like the Oslo recommendations are a good set 
of policies for the prevention of conflicts based around linguistic differences.   
 
Understanding Language Rights Policy 
 
When looking at policy governing linguistic rights there are two main categories of 
policy.  The first category represents a policy that aims to assimilate a population into the 
majority language by compelling them to use the majority language in public forums.  
Policies that fall into this assimilationist category can range from outright discrimination to 
the promotion of a majority language in public areas such as education and the legal system.  
The second group of policies seeks to maintain minority languages' presence in a nation.  
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These policies are generally active governmental support for minority languages that will 
help the language stay in active use.  The European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages desired to preserve the various regional and minority languages of Europe for the 
overall cultural heritage of the continent, thus tying the ideas of language to culture.
3
    
Another major distinction when evaluating linguistic rights is the policy related to the 
languages of regional minorities and that of immigrant minorities.  Regional minorities in the 
context of language are groups that have a historical use of the language inside of the modern 
state and have a geographic bound to the extent of that language’s use.  The Welsh in the 
United Kingdom or the Burgenland Croats of Austria are examples of regional minorities.  
Immigrant minorities are those of recent arrivals from abroad who have brought their 
language along with them.  These policies differ in their approach to determining the 
definition of a legitimate minority in the context of who gets rights.  For example, the Oslo 
Recommendations, a set of recommendations by the High Commission on National 
Minorities in regards to linguistic rights, makes various references to certain rights kicking in 
when there are “significant numbers” of a minority in a certain region.  This concept of 
“significant numbers” is never truly explained and has been primarily left up to states to 
decide which minority groups are significant enough to receive positive protections. In Serbia 
for example in order for a minority language to gain official status in a local region 15 % of 
the population must speak that language in that region or 2% nationally according to the last 
census.
4
   Because of this population threshold, linguistic rights policies, especially in the 
European context, have heavily focused on the rights of regional minorities which has 
excluded immigrant populations from the same protections that established regional 
                                                          
3
 The Council of Europe. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. 1992. 
4
Szerbhorváth György. “Language Politics and Language Rights on the Territory of Former Yugoslavia the 
Today’s Serbia/Vojvodina.” Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: European and Regional Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, 2015, p. 
64 
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minorities would receive.
5
  This gap in covering immigrants is a result of national policy 
generally viewing linguistic rights in the context of current citizens so when new minority 
groups are introduced they exist outside of the current framework of rights.  For example, the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) is one of the primary 
positive protections for minority languages. This charter and the protections provided by it 
are explicitly stated to not include “the languages of migrants.”6  This demonstrates the need 
for an overarching framework for the protection of language rights in international law that 
would provide rights for immigrants that exist outside of a nation’s already established 
framework. 
“There is no comprehensive, overarching framework for the protection of language 
rights in international law” states Sadhana Abayasekara.”7  Although international law does 
provide minority groups with language and cultural rights, it is largely up to individual states 
to determine how they will implement these rights, and there is wide variation among states 
in doing so.   
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights serves as one of the 
foundational documents in the modern conception of human rights.  It covers a wide berth of 
topics but it does briefly touch the topic of language rights in article 27, stating,  
“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their 
own religion, or to use their own language.”8 
                                                          
5
Gilman, Denise. “A ‘Bilingual’ Approach to Language Rights: How Dialogue between U.S. and International 
Human Rights Law May Improve the Language Rights Framework.” Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 24, no. 
1, 2011, p. 43 
6
 Council of Europe, “European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.” European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages, No. 148 ed., 1992. 
7
 Abayasekara, Sadhana. “A Dog without a Bark: a Critical Assessment of the International Law on Language 
Rights.” Australian International Law Journal, vol. 17, 2010, p. 90. 
8
 United Nations, “International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights.” International Covenant on Civil & Political 
Rights, 1966. 
 Brant 10 
 
 
In this, there is a fairly straightforward idea that minority groups should be allowed a policy 
of non-interference when it comes to their cultural practices, including language, inside of 
their own community.  The grouping of culture and language in this article presents the two 
as an intrinsically tied, making a case for the rights to language solely based on the 
preservation of minority cultures. This article only presents the idea of minority language 
rights as a form of a negative right, meaning that it serves only as a guard to authoritarian 
governments who might be looking to break up minority communities.  The focus of this 
article on the phrase “in community” may also allow to states   However, when discussed 
through General Comment No. 23 it is stated that in order for the protections of article 27 to 
truly be in effect there must in most cases also be some positive protections provided by the 
state.  The General Comments end with a statement that lends the article to become support 
for a maintenance policy thought stating, “The protection of these rights is directed towards 
ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity 
of the minorities concerned.”9 
 The framework of policy towards minority language was expanded with a series of 
policy recommendations in 1993 through the “The Oslo Recommendations Regarding the 
Linguistic Rights of National Minorities,” which vastly expanded and explored the scope of 
minority linguistic rights.  This expansion can be broken down into a few categories which 
will be looked at through this project: 
1. Names: peoples have the rights to name themselves, their children, and locations. 
2. Religion: people have the right to practice their religion in their own languages. 
                                                          
9
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. General Comment No. 23: The rights of 
minorities (Art. 27) : . 08/04/94.  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, General Comment No. 23. (General Comments). 
Geneva,  1994. 
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3. Community Life and NGOs: Minority groups have the right to use their own 
language for communal activities and NGO operations. 
4. The Media:  Minority groups have the right to produce media in their own language, 
and public broadcasting should also be available in minority languages.  
5. Economic Life:  People should have the right to run their businesses in whichever 
language they want. 
6. Administrative Authorities and Public Services:  In regions with a large population of 
the said minority then the government should provide services and have elected 
officials who can communicate in said language. 
7. Independent National Institutions: Linguistic minorities should have access to 
independent national institutions, like human rights commissions, that will support 
the minority group. 
8. The Judicial Authorities: The rights surrounding linguistic minorities to use their 
language in a court of law or be provided with a translator for trials.  
9. Deprivation of Liberty: the rights of prisoners to use and communicate with the 
operators of the prison in their language of choice.   
These nine groups of rights that were part of the Oslo recommendations came from the 
collective minds of international legal scholars, linguistic advocates, and policy analysts from 
all over Europe and Australia. These individuals came together to create a clear and concise 
system of linguistics rights that could be used in a framework to determine subsequent cases 
that the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) could face in the future.
10
  
This new framework developed by the Oslo recommendations is a combination of the 
ideas of maintenance and assimilation policy.  The recommendations balance out 
                                                          
10
 High Commissioner on National Minorities. The Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of 
National Minorities & Explanatory Note, Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 1998. 
P. 3 
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assimilationist recommendations, as in requiring that documents submitted to the government 
may need to be done in the state’s official language, with the providing positive protections 
with more positive maintenance protections like the need to provide free translators in 
judicial hearing for speakers of minority languages. Senior legal advisors to the HCNM, 
Iryna Ulasiuk and Laurentiu Hadirca wrote that the HCNM encourages “states to balance the 
promotion of the state language with the maintenance, re-production and protection of 
minority languages”11 thus creating a mixture of the maintenance and assimilation allowable 
through this framework.  It is through this framework that there is a recognition that a single 
state Lingua Franca is a necessary part of a functioning state; however there must also be 
rights reserved for regional minority groups to continue to practice their own language for 
reasons of culture and group identity. This recognition of language, both as a mode of 
functional communication and a key piece of the cultural makeup, increased the importance 
for states to develop efficient and fair policies governing language.  When evaluating the 
efficiency that comes with a single mode of communication inside of a system, consideration 
should also be given to the intrinsic cultural connotations that languages carry in order to 
strike a balance between the two. A balanced policy, giving consideration to both efficiency 
and cultural identity, may lead to the most stable outcomes for a multi-lingual nation.  These 
two considerations are why the HCNM sees linguistic policy as a balancing act to both 
continue to respect the existence of a cultural minority group and prevent the rise of parallel 
societies through the fracturing of the very mode of communication between peoples.
12
   
 This mixture seems to be best dealt out in a separation of the national and regional 
level’s linguistic policy.  The need for a single or smaller number of official national 
languages on a national scale to facilitate communication and economic activities on a 
national level becomes mixed with a regional approach to try and support the local heritage 
                                                          
11
 Ulasiuk, Iryna, et al. Language Policy and Conflict Prevention. Brill Nijhoff, 2018. P.45 
12
Ulasiuk, Iryna, et al. Language Policy and Conflict Prevention. Brill Nijhoff, 2018. p. 21 
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of minority groups and incorporate them into the state in a respectful manner.  This mixture 
of policy also attempts to avoid some of the pitfalls of pure maintenance and pure 
assimilation.  Fernand de Varennes and Elzbieta Kuzborska state: 
“they [Oslo Recommendations] provide guidelines to help achieve a balance between the 
maintenance of the territorial integrity of States and the claims of minorities that they are 
not treated properly as full citizens by their government… an attempt to address these 
issues at an early stage before positions become polarized and questions of identity and 
rights give way, if left unresolved, to tensions and potential conflict.”13 
 
An example of this balancing act comes from a separate set of HCNM recommendations. 
In the Hague Recommendations Regarding the Educational Rights of National Minorities 
(1996) which considers the role of a minority language in the education of minority children, 
there is an outlined plan in order to try and create a bilingual education that produces both the 
continued use of the minority language as well as a population that is able to communicate 
through a state language. It starts with primary education being taught only in the minority 
language with the state language as a side course. As children move through the educational 
process, practical and non-theoretical courses should begin to be taught in the state 
language.
14
  This compromise in bilingualism is one of the methods in which a mutually 
agreeable balance can be struck to promote stability. 
Through this project, I will use the Oslo recommendations as the framework to analyze 
how policy towards linguistic policy works in each of the three case studies, and to see if a 
further divergence from the Oslo recommendations would correlate with higher levels of 
conflict.   For the sake of simplicity, I have condensed the recommendations into four 
categories: Names, which is just the first set of policy groupings around names. This category 
looks at language in a very public, visible, and symbolic place. Communal Life, which covers 
                                                          
13
Ibid. p. 133 
14
 “The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities and Explanatory 
Note.” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol. 4, no. 2, 1996, pp. 205- 206. 
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a and looks at policy surrounding language use in a communal setting.  Economic life looks 
at policy around language when it comes to commercial entities.  Governmental 
Responsibility looks at the government’s responsibility to provide services in minority 
languages. The final piece is a review of policy towards the role of minority languages in 
Education. While not on the Oslo recommendations list, education is a key factor in linguistic 
rights and is crucial for understanding the policy that governs linguistic minorities.  All of 
these policies will be reviewed for differences at both a regional and national level, as per the 
suggestions of the Oslo Recommendations to treat them differently at each level. 
1. Names 
a. Assimilation: Preapproved name lists, Signage only in the majority language, 
ID cards only in the majority language 
b. Maintenance: Freedom in naming conventions, multilingualism in signage and 
ID cards 
2. Communal Life  
a. Assimilation: Restrictions on the language of religious ceremony, barring of 
minority cultural events, media only produced in the majority language 
b. Maintenance: supporting the use of minority language in religious ceremonies, 
minority cultural events, and the production of media in minority languages 
through grants  
3. Economic life 
a. Assimilation: People are able to run and manage their businesses in only the 
majority language 
b. Maintenance: People are able to run and manage their businesses in whichever 
language they chose  
4. Governmental Responsibility 
a. Assimilation: the government only operates in the majority language and 
offers no services in minority languages 
b. Maintenance: the government will offer services in multiple languages along 
with having a court system that supplies translators  
5. Education 
a. Assimilation: Education in the majority language only  
b. Maintenance: Public education is offered in minority languages.  
 
Throughout the rest of this project, I will look at the case studies of Canada, The 
United Kingdom, and France through the established framework of the Oslo 
recommendations in order to observe how the recommendations compare to the states 
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established policy.   The case studies will show a range of dealings towards linguistic policies 
with France being an example of a strong assimilationist policy, Canada is an example of 
strong maintenance policy, and the UK is an example of the regional maintenance approach 
of the Oslo Recommendations set of policies.  The case studies will look at that nation's 
relationship with the various policy groupings that I have brought up in this section and then 
look at the events around the nations linguistic tensiosn.  These factors together will 
hopefully give some measure of the effectiveness of the policies in that nation.  Throughout 
these case studies, I hope to give support to the idea the ideas found in the Oslo 
recommendations truly will be best in preventing conflict around language.  
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The United Kingdom and Wales 
In this case study, the linguistic policies of the United Kingdom are discussed with a 
focus on the linguistic rights and protections that have developed around the Welsh language.  
The Welsh language is, as of the 2011 census, able to be spoken by 23.3 percent of the Welsh 
population.
15
  Activist groups fighting for the languages’ protection caused a lot of tension in 
the lead up to devolution.  Much of this tension has been dispersed in the years since the 
Welsh assembly started to provide positive protections for the language; however, new 
tensions have risen due to issues around the role of the education system in the protection of 
Welsh. The United Kingdom’s overall policy on language has allowed for these tensions to 
remain fairly low and contented inside the region with these linguistic minorities.   
A Brief History of the Linguistic Policy of Wales 
The United Kingdom and its predecessors have a long history with linguistic rights. 
From the Statute of Pleading of 1362, which declared English as the only language of the 
courts, to the 1549 Act of Uniformity, which set English as the only language to be used in 
prayer, language has been regulated. However, as the United Kingdom entered the modern 
era, the policies governing language became more liberal in order to adapt to regional 
minorities' long-established resentment to the assimilationist policies of centuries past.
16
 
These original policies had chipped away at the number of Welsh speakers over time to near 
extinction. According to the 2011 census, only nineteen percent of the people in Wales speak 
the Welsh language.
17
 These policies, which led to the decrease in Welsh speakers in the 
modern era has led to an ongoing debate over the Welsh language's role in society. The 
                                                          
15
 Welsh language data -third release. Welsh Government, 16 May 2013. 
16
 Nagy, Noemi. “Western European Perspectives towards Language Minorities and Linguistic Rights--Then and 
Now/Prospettive Dell'Europa Occidentale Verso Le Minoranze Linguistiche e i Diritti Linguistici--Allora e Ora.” 
Journal of Constitutional History (Giornale Di Storia Costituzionale), no. 30, 2015, p. 130. 
17
 Office for National Statistics. "2011 Census." Office for National Statistics, 11 Dec. 2012. 
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minority speakers feel that speaking Welsh is a fundamental tenet in the preservation of the 
Welsh identity. 
The first modern major protest around Welsh language rights took place in 1963 in 
the small university town nestled in the heart of the Welsh countryside, Aberystwyth.  The 
protests occurred because the newly formed Cymdeithas yr Iaith (Welsh Language Society) 
attempted to get one of their members arrested for vandalizing a post office. The post office 
was vandalized in order to taunt the opposition, as they hoped that the result would be a 
denial of the right to use Welsh in their subsequent trial, strengthening their case of unfair 
treatment.  The protest ended with no arrests as the police were aware of Cymdeithas yr 
Iaith’s plan.  However, this event would come to be proudly remembered as a key protest that 
kickstarted the movement for Welsh language rights.
18
  This protest was followed by more 
protests in Aberystwyth around bilingual street signage and Welsh-speaking dorm halls at the 
university. And, in the 1970s and 1980s, mass protests led to the creation of a Welsh-only 
radio and television channel, S4C.  The ongoing work by activist groups like Cymdeithas yr 
Iaith and political parties like Plaid Cymru was critical in the passing of the Welsh Language 
Acts of 1967 and 1993, as well as the Welsh Language Measure of 2011 which finally led to 
an what was viewed as an appropriate level of governmental support for the Welsh language 
inside of Wales.
19
 
The first significant piece of legislation in the process of granting greater recognition 
to the Welsh language was The Welsh Language Act of 1967.  This brief act of British 
parliament repealed previous rules that English would be the only language of the courts and 
made it so “any party, witness or other person who desires to use it”20  may use the Welsh 
                                                          
18
 Jones, Rhys. “Relocating Nationalism: on the Geographies of Reproducing Nations.” Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, vol. 33, no. 3, 2008, p 329. 
19
 Cymdeithas yr Iaith. "What is Cymdeithas Yr Iaith?" Cymdeithas Yr Iaith Gymraeg. 
20
 United Kingdom, Parliament. Welsh Language Act 1967. 27 July 1967. 
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language in legal proceedings inside of the territory of Wales.  This act was expanded and 
fortified by the Welsh Language Act 1993 which explicitly stated that Welsh and English be 
treated equally in the eyes of the law. And, it went on to state that any organization providing 
services in Wales could be required to create Welsh Language Schemes which outline the 
provided services in Welsh. The act also gave the Welsh government the right to give a 
Welsh language name to any official governmental or public body.
21
 
The next major piece of legislation to further Welsh language rights was the 
Broadcasting Act 1981.  Throughout the 1970s, there were significant protests aimed at 
persuading the government to open a fourth television channel in Wales that would serve as a 
Welsh language channel.  These protests ranged from Welsh speakers not paying their TV 
license fees to MP Gwynfor Evans threatening a hunger strike until the Thatcher government 
approved the station.
22
  The fourth channel, funded by the national government, was 
eventually approved as part of the Broadcasting Act 1981.
23
  Thus, in 1982, the Welsh 
language channel S4C was launched.  The station while praised in concept has faced protests 
over its failure to secure a wide range of viewers and high costs.
24
  
Additional progress was made for language rights in 1988 when the Education 
Reform Act made Welsh a core subject for all students in Wales.
25
  This ensured that the 
Welsh language was taught and remained relevant in the lives of the youth in a structured 
school setting.  This key piece of legislation is an example of a maintenance policy, which 
demonstrates the transition of policy merely tolerating langue rights to one of active and 
ongoing support and promotion.    
                                                          
21
 “Welsh Language Act 1993.” Law Wales, Welsh Government/Westlaw.uk, 13 July 2015. 
22
 BBC. "Gwynfor Evans at 90." BBC News, 1 Sept. 2002. 
23
 United Kingdom, Parliament. Broadcasting Act 1981. 1981. 
24
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/2384025.stm 
25
 Nagy, Noemi. “Western European Perspectives towards Language Minorities and Linguistic Rights--Then and 
Now/Prospettive Dell'Europa Occidentale Verso Le Minoranze Linguistiche e i Diritti Linguistici--Allora e Ora.” 
Journal of Constitutional History (Giornale Di Storia Costituzionale), no. 30, 2015, p. 131. 
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Progress continued for the Welsh language with the enactment of the Government of 
Wales Act of 1998.  This legislation served as a major part of the more general trend of 
devolution which saw the nations that make up the United Kingdom gain more autonomy. 
The main point of this legislation was the establishment of the Welsh National Assembly.  
The bill had far-reaching implications for the local government’s power in Wales because 
from that point forward, Wales itself would be allowed to set its own policy governing the 
use of its language.  With the establishment of the Welsh National assembly, there was also a 
requirement to prepare all legislation bilingually.
26
  
In 2011, the last of the significant linguistic reform bills was passed with The Welsh 
Language Measure. This bill set Welsh as an official language, on equal footing with English, 
inside of Wales.  Along with this, the bill set up the Welsh Language Commissioner’s Office 
in order to monitor the state of Welsh linguistic rights.
27
  Its powers and standards are set 
yearly by the Welsh Language Standards and the Welsh Language Schemes.  These 
documents have set up a basic framework for the protection of the Welsh language in the 
public sphere.  Under these protections, people in Wales have the right to communicate with 
any organization through the Welsh language as well as the freedom to use the Welsh 
language to communicate with another Welsh speaker in Welsh at any point.
28
  The Welsh 
Language Commissioner also actively promotes the use of the Welsh language and services 
in the Welsh language through campaigns like “Welsh Language Rights Day.”29  
However, the annual Welsh language standards have also seen a fair amount of 
criticism.  Meirion Prys Jones, ex-chief executive of the Welsh Language Board and current 
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chief executive of the European Network to Promote Linguistic Diversity, expressed in 2017 
that the ministers in charge of setting the standards “became obsessed with the idea of 
regulation, the idea that you need to hit organizations hard who did not provide enough 
services in Welsh and they set about putting a system in place."
30
  The criticism of extreme 
bureaucratic meddling is even admitted by Welsh Language Minister Alun Davies when he 
stated about the language standards, "They can be too complicated at times, both the process 
of designing and implementing."
31
  Showing that even people who have an interest in the 
promotion and maintenance of the Welsh language had seen the recent developments of the 
annual standards as detrimental to Wales as a whole through their strict regulations.  
Outside of the more rights-based policies, the Welsh government has attempted to put 
policies in place that would actively raise awareness and interest in of the Welsh language.  
The current overarching plan for this is Cymraeg 2050.  According to the Welsh minister for 
Lifelong Learning and Welsh Language, Alun Davies, the plan is to “see the Welsh language 
being part of our daily lives in all parts of Wales. That means a change in approach, and we 
have to change that approach.”32  The majority of this plan is funded through grants from the 
UK government.
33
   This strategy is an attempt to raise the Welsh-speaking population to over 
a million by the year 2050 in order to increase the prominence of the language in the lives of 
the Welsh population.  The three-pronged approach started with an attempt to grow the 
number of people speaking Welsh inside of Wales, widen the use of Welsh, and create 
infrastructure and context for people to speak Welsh.
34
  The plan lays out long term 
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recommendations for the furthering of the Welsh language, which are implied to be essential 
in the equality of Welsh and English inside of Wales.   
An Overview of the Modern Policies 
1. Names 
a. Welsh Language Act directly gives the right to use Welsh names or 
descriptive words for any statutory body, public purpose or credit unions.
35
   
2. Communal Life  
a. Welsh language television stations accompany English language stations 
provided to the people in Wales 
b. Attempt for 1 million Welsh speakers by 2050 
3. Economic life 
a. Companies must let Welsh speakers use Welsh in business  
4. Governmental Responsibility 
a. Laws must be passed and distributed in a bilingual manner 
b. Court hearings must accept the use of Welsh  
5. Education 
a. Mandatory Welsh education for those younger than 16 
b. Schools may choose to teach entirely in Welsh  
c. Current changes happening to the school curriculum   
 
Context and Impact of Welsh Language Rights in the broader UK 
The United Kingdom is a signatory of the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (ECRML), giving the nation a bit of an established framework for dealing with 
the rights of regional minorities outside of national policy.  Charter obligations include 
government support for the use of the regional minority language in education, broadcasting, 
cultural activities, and support for its use in the realm of administrative and legal functions.
36
 
The United Kingdom, through allowing Wales to set most of its own language policy, follows 
through with these obligations.  However, there really is not much of any support for the use 
of these regional languages outside of their designated region.  Most policy towards language 
is passed entirely to the local level where the needs can be determined, however, this limits 
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the rights of minority language speakers to use their language and receive services in other 
parts of the nation.
37
      
How local and national policy compare to Oslo  
 In comparison to Oslo, the United Kingdom does a good job bringing the important 
factors of the Oslo recommendations into policy at the regional and national levels.  Rules 
around signage, support for Welsh community events, bilingual courts and administration 
inside of Wales, and governmental support for a Wales language television station are all 
factors that bring the British policy fairly in line with the ideas presented in Oslo. The only 
fundamental difference in policy is with recommendation 12 which would allow for any 
private enterprises to operate in the language of their choice, however, Welsh policy gives 
rights to Welsh speakers to use Welsh in a business regardless of company policy thus giving 
more agency to the employee over the company in setting the linguistic meta of the 
workplace.      
Conflicts Born from Linguistic Policy 
Welsh Language Conflict with Other Minorities 
 One conflict that has arisen from the emergence of Welsh language rights is that 
between the minority Welsh speakers and the newly arrived ethnic minorities.  In late 2017 
Dr. Abdul-Azim Ahmed, Assistant Secretary-General of the Muslim Council of Wales, 
published an op-ed in the Institute of Welsh Affairs (IWA) grappling with his thoughts on the 
Welsh language’s role in the perpetuation of racism in the country.  Dr. Ahmed wrote, “the 
Welsh language can simply be another way in which outsiders are shut out, rejected, and 
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made to not belong.”38  The article caused an uproar online appearing in the r/Wales 
subreddit with almost quadruple the average comment interactions for the forum.  Inside 
these discussions, various users attacked both the article and any user who seemed to relate to 
what was said in the article.
39
  The conversation around the article seemed to have become so 
much that IWA and the author pulled it from the website for both reasons of the reaction to 
the article and issues with the claims made initially in the article.
40
  This incident 
demonstrates the tension that exists between newly arrived migrant communities in Wales 
and the Welsh-speaking communities over the role that the Welsh language should play in 
society.  However, there are many new arrivals who see learning Welsh as a vital piece of 
integrating into the country with many Welsh people being truly supportive of the efforts that 
these new arrivals make.
41
   
Demographic Conflict  
Many of the places where Welsh is natively spoken are rural towns in northern Wales.  
These towns over the last thirty to forty years have faced significant demographic change 
with English speaking retirees moving into this region from across the border and thus 
disrupting the community’s core makeup of Welsh speakers.  This movement has been 
concerning to many in the Welsh language communities who have started to call for more 
protective measures for their language.
42
  One of these calls came in 2005 in the form of a 
joint plan laid out by local authorities (LAs), Bwrdd yr Iaith (the Welsh Language Board 
(WLB)), the Home Builders Federation (HBF) and the Welsh Assembly Government 
(WAG), called “Planning and the Welsh Language: The Way Ahead.”  This document 
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attempted to give recommendations on the use of land planning in order to preserve the 
Welsh language.  One of the recommendations that comes in sections 4.5 and 4.6 revolves 
around the idea that housing permits in areas with communities of Welsh language speakers 
should consider the implication that new building and the new inward migration into the town 
could affect the communities’ ability to remain Welsh-speaking.  With it stated that “The 
[housing] targets should be set having regard to the potential overall impact on the Welsh 
Language.”43  The ideas presented in this outline still exist, with it being reported by PRI in 
2015 that policymakers still will call for the restriction of new housing projects in order to not 
dilute the concentration of Welsh speakers in many areas.
44
 These suggestions came in the 
wake of mass protests in 2002 by the group Cymuned over the building of homes in northern 
Wales that were too expensive for the Welsh-speaking locals and primarily advertised to 
English speakers from across the border.  These protests went so far as to petition to the 
United Nations for support to stop the construction and threat to these Welsh-speaking 
communities.
45
  However, these concerns received significant push back from many English 
speakers living in Wales.  A prime example of this is the reaction that Gwynedd County 
Councillor Seimon Glyn, member of Plaid Cymru, received after claiming on BBC Wales in 
2001 that the number of English people moving into Wales needed to be strictly monitored 
and that the English should be forced to learn Welsh if they did move in.  These comments 
almost landed Glyn with a hate speech charge by the local police and the party itself received 
massive backlash from English speaking voters who turned against Plaid Cymru in the 
election that year, costing them massively.
46
  The backlash showed that the issues around the 
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protection of the Welsh language were still polarizing inside of Wales and that the English 
speaking population would react poorly to any overtly radical ideas around its protection. 
Education 
As previously established, one of the critical components of linguistic policy is the 
approach taken to language in an educational setting.  In Wales, the role of Welsh language 
education has served as both a critical factor in creating a balanced system for English and 
Welsh speakers, and a source of tension between speakers of both languages.  In 1999, the 
Welsh language was introduced as a compulsorily subject for students in Wales up until the 
age of sixteen. However, many schools can choose to become a “Welsh-medium” school 
which provides instruction in topics outside of the study of the Welsh language through the 
medium of the Welsh language.  Along with this, the general approach to the way that the 
Welsh language is taught in English speaking schools in Wales will be shifted in the coming 
years. Schools will be reworking the curriculum to remove the Welsh language as a subject 
and use it as a medium in which some content throughout the day is taught in more traditional 
English language schools.
 47  
 This seems at least in part an attempt to bring the concept of 
bilingual education more in line with what is outlined in the Hague Recommendations 
Regarding the Educational Rights of National Minorities (1996) which recommends that 
minority languages to be taught effectively need to be incorporated into the teaching of 
content not inherently related to that language.
48
  
While it may seem simple to adjust the approach to language usage in schools, the 
implementation will likely create complications.  The shift the Welsh language has gone 
through from subject to a method of teaching some material will put a severe strain on the 
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financial resources of Wales.  Currently, only thirty-four percent of teachers in the Welsh 
education system identify as Welsh language speakers, meaning that significant investment in 
Welsh language training for teachers across the country would be required in order to 
establish a curriculum that would naturally incorporate the Welsh language in the teaching of 
non-Welsh language material.
49
  Tim Pratt, director of the Association of School and College 
Leaders (ASCL) Cymru, commenting on the announcement of the planned curriculum 
change stated: "The level of funding allocated to schools does not provide enough money for 
the teaching of the current curriculum, and whilst the additional funds announced are 
welcome, they will not on their own be sufficient to meet the additional requirements.”50 
The bilingual education policy of Wales allows for some flexibility in approach. 
Towns are allowed to designate schools as having the curriculum in the Welsh language only.  
In 2017, about a third of all schools in Wales are taught in Welsh only.  This has caused 
significant tension in many villages that have both Welsh and English-speaking people.  In 
2017, The Guardian published an article that explored the tensions and stresses placed on 
English speakers in towns that had or were planning on having schools that taught in Welsh 
only.
51
  The article put a spotlight on Llangennech, a village in Wales with both English and 
Welsh speakers, whose primary school had shifted from English to Welsh education. The 
article reported that the tensions between Welsh and English speakers in the town were high 
as a result of the change. The article stated that many English speakers felt like “second class 
citizens.” It described one local woman expressing that she was scared to go shopping at 
stores like the local co-op. She stated “Perhaps I’m being paranoid but I’m really scared at 
the moment. I’m not sure it’s good for the reputation of the Welsh language.”  The town’s 
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decision to transition its primary schools to Welsh-only teaching put the town’s people in a 
conflict over the limited resource of its one primary school, pitting the communities of Welsh 
and English speakers against each other.  Welsh-speaking groups such as Parents for Welsh 
Medium Education stated that the changes revolved around the idea that Welsh families have 
long lost out on their ability to give their children education in the Welsh language and are 
just making that an option.  They go further by stating that English-speaking children “won’t 
be denied the English language. They will be able to travel [to schools that offer it].”  On the 
other hand, some English-speaking families expressed to The Guardian that, 
Our children feel they are no longer welcome. They’ve been ostracised from their 
peers. Their community is divided on the basis of language and they are now treated 
like second-class citizens. My neighbour [sic] actually said she wanted our children 
out of the school. The village is damaged.
52
  
This investigation shows the current policy governing language in Wales is still a major 
source of tension and conflict for the peoples of Wales. 
Nationalist Groups 
 The main nationalist party in Wales is Plaid Cymru.  The party has been a significant 
force in the fight for recognition of the Welsh language and remains relevant in the modern 
politics of Wales.  Founded in 1925, Plaid Cymru didn’t find broad support until1936, when 
three members of the leadership set fire to an under-construction aerodrome near the town of 
Pwllheli.
53
  The party continued to fight for Welsh self-rule and rights for the use of the 
Welsh language over the years. Today, the party sits in opposition to the governments both in 
the United Kingdom parliament, where they have four serving MPs and in the National 
Assembly for Wales, where they have ten members of the assembly.  The party has primarily 
existed as part of the opposition except from 2007-2011 when they were in coalition with 
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Labour in the National Assembly for Wales.  This move gave Plaid Cymru the power to push 
Welsh language funding and eventual acts like the Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011 at 
the forefront of the political debates.  However, it was also seen as a significant step for the 
rising nationalist movements in the United Kingdom by some members of the media.
54
  The 
party lives in the space of left-wing, pro-Europe nationalism, where the modern party in the 
2019 election stood for a second EU referendum and attempted to bring funding into Wales 
for things like a "green jobs revolution" and more money for Welsh institutions of learning.
55
  
 One the other end of the nationalist discourse is the Brexit and UK independence 
parties.  Both are right-wing nationalist parties that played significant roles in the Brexit 
process.  The parties share an ideology of nationalism for the United Kingdom over the 
regionalism for Wales that is held by groups like Plaid Cymru. Both parties exist today with 
very little power. However, they both still hold on to seats in the National Assembly for 
Wales, where the Brexit party has four seats, and The United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) holds onto a single seat.  UKIP in Wales has supplanted the Liberal Democrats as the 
fourth largest party for a time in the fifth assembly (2016) with seven of the sixty seats in the 
assembly.  During this same election, an ex-UKIP candidate formed his own party with the 
name “Abolish the Welsh Assembly Party.”  The party ran a series of candidates for the 
Welsh assembly with the goal of “scrapping the National Assembly.”56 The “Abolish the 
Welsh Assembly Party” did not win any seats in the National Assembly for Wales, however, 
they did receive four-and four-tenths of a percent of the vote in that election putting them 
between the Liberal Democrats and the Green party for the number of votes received in that 
election. Showing that there remains a significant portion of the population that stands against 
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the general trend of devolution has allowed for much of the movement in the Welsh language 
rights movement.  
 Many regional assemblies in the United Kingdom are home to some form of left-wing 
pro-Europe nationalistic force, such as the Scottish National Party in the Scottish Parliament 
or Sinn Féin in the Stormont. However, the left-wing welsh nationalistic forces in Wales are 
also meeting right-wing nationalist forces focused on the union over the power of the Welsh 
nation.  While language has never been a major talking point, these parties focus on an 
independent union with less devolution, removing the means in which Welsh language 
protections have been produced, which in turn supports the narrative against the expansion of 
programs for the Welsh language.    
General Conclusion 
 The current government of Wales is a coalition between the Labour party and the 
Liberal Democrats, but this came only after an agreement between Labour and Plaid Cymru.  
These talks resulted in the "Moving Wales Forward," a plan that gave concessions to Plaid 
Cymru, which included amendments to the Language Measure.
57
 However, after years of 
pushing forward with more and more power and protection for the Welsh language and its 
speakers, 2019 represented a step backward.  In the shadow of a UK general election that 
voted in a federal government which wished to quickly pass a Brexit deal, the local Welsh 
government cut its funding for Welsh language education by about fifteen percent.  For 
Welsh speakers, it was a sign that the government was turning its back on them.
58
 It also 
indicated that the fight over linguistic policy still produced conflict over material funding for 
the positive protections that many policies seek to provide. 
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 The strong maintenance policy that has existed in Wales has led to a massive tension 
between the Welsh and English speakers. However, the policies have also massively shifted 
the conflict around language from one of the mass protests like that founded with Plaid 
Cymru’s origins or those that occurred in Aberystwyth during the 1960s to an 
institutionalized political discourse.  Political institutionalization is not to say that protests 
and conflicts stemming from language no longer exist in Wales.  Groups like Cymdeithas yr 
Iaith still hold noticeable protests.  In 2014 six-point policy plan towards the Welsh language 
presented by the group was ignored by the government and had a dozen people chain 
themselves to government offices in Aberystwyth in response.
59
  
 The granting of various positive and negative rights governing the Welsh language in 
the past fifty years has decreased the conflict in the region and brought Plaid Cymru, one of 
the original supporters of Welsh language rights, into a more formal role in governing, thus 
giving a more powerful voice to Welsh speakers.  Tensions remain in some parts of Wales 
over the topic of housing and education, but the days of attempting arson on government 
property seem to be a thing of the past.  
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France and Corsica 
In this case study the linguistic policies of France are discussed with a special focus on 
how the policies affect Corsica.  The chapter outlines how France came to strongly believe in 
a series of assimilationist policies towards language and how those policies have only 
strengthened during the last 30 years as France becomes worried about the rising use of 
English and so institutionalized the importance of the French language in its constitution.  
This has left many of France's regional languages, such as Breton, Basque, Corsican, and 
German, with very little support and in many cases suppression in the public sphere.  This has 
resulted in a wide range of protests and in the case of Corsica a major reason behind a violent 
resistance to French authorities.   
 
French history with linguistic policy 
The French revolution saw the establishment of the philosophical framework that the 
language policy of France has used since.  While initially pro the use of regional languages 
inside of the government, the eventual Jacobin takeover would shift to a strict assimilationist 
policy.  The government believed that regional languages served to slow the spread of 
revolutionary ideas, and thus they enforced strict policies of only allowing French for 
education and government documents.  In a 1794 law, jail time was established for those who 
violated provisions around using the French language.  This was furthered in the next 
century, with education being shifted to being secular and the medium of education became 
French only.  This was changed in 1951 when certain regional languages (Basque, Breton, 
Catalan, and Occitan) were allowed to be taught as one-hour elective courses in their 
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respective regions.
60
  The general sense of assimilation into the French language found much 
support with the liberal Republicans of the day.  Philosopher John Stuart Mill wrote about 
how he believed that getting everyone in France to speak French opened up many 
opportunities for people who would have been, from a position of pure function, unable to 
join wider society due to their speaking of only a regional language.
61
  
The major difference between how France and the previous case of Wales looks at 
linguistic rights is that while in Wales, the issues of language rights can be seen as a 
collective issue.  This means that for Welsh speakers to continue to use their rights as Welsh 
speakers there are positive protections, while France sees the issues of language as solely an 
individual issue and only possibility of negative protections possibly necessary.    France very 
strongly views all of its citizens as individuals, and thus attempts to avoid any labeling of 
peoples as minorities.  This, while creating a system where individuals are allowed to use 
whatever language they wish privately, misses the idea that language places a key role in 
community and culture as well as any rights for people and communities wishing to use their 
language in the public sphere.  This leads to situations where minority communities are 
refused the level of recognition and support that groups like the Welsh have received in the 
preservation of their language and culture.  The right to private use but nothing else excludes 
minority language speakers in France from getting any services from the French government 
in the minority language, excluding many from government services.  Because of this France 
diverges massively from the positive maintenance policies that states like the United 
Kingdom are refusing to provide communal protections, funding for cultural events, and 
providing government services in minority languages.       
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A major point of disagreement between the French and Welsh model for linguistic 
rights is that of the role of the minority language in the courtroom.  Where in Wales the use 
of Welsh in legal presidings was an early priority for the Welsh language rights movement, in 
France the use of a minority language in the realm of the courts is something that would be 
seen as hyper-unproductive for the function of the court and thus not even on the table when 
considering rights expansion.  Fernand de Varennes, the current United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Minority Issues, observed in 1996 that in France, "a trial is not a private forum 
for an individual to express her or his point of view. Rather, it is a public activity conducted 
under the auspices of the state for the public good," and thus, the inclusion of any use of 
minority languages would just serve as a detriment to the public function.
62
   
Modern-day 
On June 25, 1992, the French congress amended the constitution to state that "The 
language of the Republic is French."
63
  The amendment came as France found itself 
becoming more integrated into the EU, which promoted multilingualism and growing global 
pressure for its citizens to learn and operate businesses in English.  There were many who 
feared that the amendment would cause harm to the regional minority languages spoken in 
France, with some members of parliament proposing an amendment to the previously passed 
amendment making the official language of France French with the statement "while 
respecting the regional languages and cultures of France." However, this proposed 
amendment was completely shot down, with the only concession to regional language 
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speakers being a statement by the then Minister of Justice, Michel Vauzelle, on how the 
amendment would not change any of France's support for cultural diversity.
64
 
The Toubon law passed on August 4, 1994, furthers the French language amendment 
by outlining regulation around the use of French as "the language of education, work, 
exchanges, and public services."
65
  The law, in essence, makes French the only usable 
language in the government, the French business world, broadcasting, and all government-
financed schools.  The law brought up many concerns with speakers of regional languages.  
Two years later after the law's passage, French Polynesia had made a strong enough case over 
the law’s problems in the overseas territory that they gained special exception from the law, 
allowing native languages to be used in the fields covered by the law.
66
 The law was also 
seen as an issue by many in the French media who saw it as an "outdated tool of fight against 
English."
67
 
France is one of the few states in the Council of Europe that has not ratified The 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.  The Charter, discussed in the first 
chapter, looks at protections for regional minority languages inside of Europe.  The United 
Kingdom is a signer, and thus many protections from the Charter were applied to the Welsh 
language since their ratification in 2001.  France, on the other hand, strongly rejected the 
notion of the Charter, and instituted the 1992 amendment designating French as the sole 
language of France the same year as the charter’s signing.  French linguist Bernard 
Cerquiglini projected that under the Charter, seventy-five regional languages and dialects 
would have to gain some level of recognition and protection.  However, Cerquiglini 
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afterward parroted the French general consensus on the topic of minority languages by stating 
"language, as an element of culture, belongs to the national heritage" over the heritage of any 
particular minority population.
68
 
In June of 1999, the president of France had the Constitutional Council take a look at 
whether the Charter would be in line with the current French constitution.  The Constitutional 
Council, after deliberation, determined that the Charter, more specifically the materials of 
Title II, to be unconstitutional with the current French constitution.  The problem which the 
Constitutional Council saw with the Charter rested with Title II's designation for rights for 
regional minority groups to use their language in a public sphere.  Another major issue that 
the Constitutional Council had with the Charter was the Charter's use of the term "groups," 
which seemed to go against the principle of individual liberty and a single French identity 
that is foundational to the French perception of rights. Now the issue with this determination 
is it ignored an "interpretative statement" prepared by the French government, which saw that 
the Charter would have been interpreted into a French context for its application and thus the 
"groups" spoken about would have been interpreted as individual people.
69
  The decision was 
seen as controversial in the media with there being some movement on the part of the Prime 
Minister at the time to attempt the constitution to allow for ratification for the Charter–
70
showing on some grounds that there was at least an attempt to break away from the 
assimilationist nature of the French linguist policy. 
In 2008 after the debacle with the Constitutional Council, a constitutional amendment 
was passed in 2008 to try and bring forward more recognition for regional minority 
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languages.  The Constitutional law 2008-724 stated that "Regional languages belong to the 
heritage of France." This gave regional minority languages in France a recognition that they 
did not have before to be used in the sense of national culture.  However, the wording of the 
amendment serves not totally to allow for the protection of regional minority speakers but 
also the abstract cultural value of these languages. It would boil down to languages outside of 
France losing any of their value of purpose in functionality.  Another thing this did from the 
perspective of regional minority speakers was to transfer the ownership of the language from 
the people to the state. Bernard Cerquiglini, a former executive on the General Delegation for 
the French Language and the Languages of France (DGLFLF), stated in 1999 a sentiment 
that seemed to inform this amendment when stating, "Corsican is not the property of the 
Corsican region, but of the nation."
71
 
The issues of the Charter for Regional or Minority Languages remained relevant to the 
political environment of France in the ensuing years.  The previous president François 
Hollande campaigned in 2012 on a promise to pass the Charter, and the European Union had 
also continued to put pressure on France to pass the Charter.  A bill attempting to allow for 
constitutional ratification of the Charter entered into French parliament in 2014, riding the 
wave of Hollande's agenda.
72
  However, this attempt was stopped in 2015 by the Conseil 
d'État under the same logic at the Constitutional Council’s decision.73 
An Overview of the Modern Policies 
Today the governmental policies of France towards language rest mainly in the "right to 
French," which is primarily protections and support for the singular use of the French 
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language as the medium for life in the nation of France.  The general delegation for the 
French language and the languages of France's website states their main goal for the 
linguistic policy was, 
Guarantee the use of French, the language of the Republic, in all circumstances of social 
life, and promote its adaptation to the contemporary world, while developing openness to 
other languages, constitutive of our history and keys to our openness to the world.
74
 
This shows that while more government policy towards language in France still remains in 
this sense protection for the French language in the same vein as the 1992 amendment, there 
is a show of support for regional minority languages in the statement "while developing 
openness to other languages, constitutive of our history" which while still in the framework 
of the 2008 amendment designating these languages as part of a cultural heritage apart from 
any needed functionality.  France, even after these changes, is still a France where bilingual 
street signs are still banned in many cities, where minority languages do not have support in 
media, and wherein education, many children are told their language is not legitimate.
75
  An 
overview of France's linguistic policy in the first chapters outlined five categories are in the 
chart below. 
 An Overview of the Modern Policies 
1. Names 
a. Bilingual street signs banned in many places 
b. Public bodies named in French  
2. Communal Life  
a. Some cultural festivals, such as La Ringueta in Occitan communities, are 
permitted 
3. Economic life 
a. Business must operate in French  
4. Governmental Responsibility 
i. Government documents in French only 
b. Courts operate in French 
5. Education 
a. Private secular institutions may be allowed to operate in a minority language 
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b. Some recognized minority languages may receive support to be taught in 
French schools
76
 
i. These must remain strictly optional 
1. Minority languages never as the medium of instruction 
 
Oslo and French Policy 
 The Oslo recommendations and French linguistic policy are very different, to say the 
least. In the areas of signage and the wider role of linguistic naming in France, French is the 
only allowed language in most places.  The role of the federal government, in administration 
and court matters, is solely in the language of French, a stark difference from what is 
recommended in Oslo.  The role of French as the only allowed language in France's business 
world is also a major differentiation from France's policy and Oslo as a whole.  While France 
does currently provide some protections, the Oslo recommendations recommend, like support 
for a few cultural activities, France as a whole is the most divergent case study from the Oslo 
recommendations.     
 
France’s Language Policy as the Cause of Political Conflict 
In response to the continued lack of positive protections or even recognition for many of 
the regional languages present in France, there have been ongoing political conflicts that have 
occasionally turned violent.  Protests in support for regional languages around France have 
materialized at times of debate around the previously discussed policy.  One of the best 
examples of this was during the 2012 presidential election in which tens of thousands of 
people around the nation marched in support for the ratification of the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages.  Three candidates in that election ended up supporting the 
ratification of the Charter with the winning candidate, François Hollande, amongst the three 
                                                          
76
 Leigh Oakes. “Promoting Language Rights as Fundamental Individual Rights: France as a Model?” French 
Politics, vol. 9, no. 1, 2011, p. 63. 
 Brant 39 
 
supporters.
77
 A year after the election of Hollande, there had been no real movement on the 
ratification of the Charter, which spurred a new set of protests where campaigners from many 
of France’s minority languages went to The United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Paris headquarters to ask for some form of intervention 
and "cultural asylum." The protesters held banners with phrases like "French state killing our 
languages," which showed the desperation the campaigners had reached.
78
  The protests that 
occurred during this election cycle were part of the reason the 2015 attempt to pass the 
Charter happened.  
Pro-Occitan Calandreta Federation of schools and the Institute of Occitan Studies 
attempted to follow up on these 2012 protests in 2015 when the ratification of the Charter 
came under threat.  The protests were joined by parallel protests by Breton, Basque, Corsican, 
and German groups, who feared their languages were nearing extinction under the current 
French linguistic policy.
79
  With the Charter failing to pass again in 2015, regional languages 
would continue to face a lack of support with another round of protest occurring in 2019 
organized by the Regional Center of Occitan Teaching of Toulouse.  These protests located 
solely in Occitania this time around were triggered by a French government budget cut, 
which removed funding for the secondary education Occitan language classes in the Toulouse 
region.  This led to protests of anywhere from five thousand to two thousand people in 
Toulouse who were angered by the change.
80
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Corsica 
One of the prime examples of the conflict that has been born from France’s policy 
towards minority languages is that of Corsica.  In 1769, the island of Corsica was ceded from 
the Republic of Genoa to France.  Soon afterward, the French revolution would occur, 
drastically shifting the views towards regional languages held by the government of France.  
The official language of the island would eventually shift from Italian to French, a transition 
which left the native language of Corsican without any government support. With this, the 
Corsican language has slowly degraded to its modern status as a minority language inside of 
the island.  As of 2012, it was estimated that anywhere between 28 and 42% of the island's 
population had some form of competency but only 10% of people were considered "good 
speakers" of the language.
81 
The island has received a fair amount of autonomy from the mainland in the last forty 
years starting in 1982, with the island gaining the status of territorial collectivity and the 
establishment of the Corsican Assembly that would possess greater powers than a traditional 
regional council on the mainland.  This new body of Corsican governance has tried multiple 
times to go against the wider French constitution in order to pass a bill to claim Corsican as 
the official language of the island; however, most of these attempts have been a wider 
acknowledgment that any attempts to bring status to the Corsican language would be a major 
and long term goal.
82
  
Corsica traditionally has been a hotbed of nationalist fervor, driven in part by a desire for 
recognition of the Corsican language.  In the late 20
th
 century, violent nationalists took arms 
and committed over ten thousand attacks on the island.  Most of these attacked were low 
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violence mainly made up of exploding bombs placed in unoccupied cars or buildings.
83
 The 
violence ended in 2014 when the nationalist groups decided to put down their arms and 
integrate themselves and their beliefs into the political process.
84
  The group to start the 
disarmament was the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica, which was unexpected in 
their laying down of arms, but did claim that if this peaceful period did not lead to movement 
in support of the group's goals "Corsican frustration will lead to more violence, worse than 
ever before."
85
 
On December 17, 2015, Jean-Guy Talamoni, the leader of the left-wing Corsican 
separatist political party, Corsica Libera, was elected as the president of the Corsican 
Assembly.  He came to power through a coalition between the Corsica Libera party and the 
Femu a Corsica party.  The coalition secured forty-one of the sixty-three seats in the Corsican 
assembly in order to form the current Corsican nationalist government.  Talamoni, early in 
his role, stated that "Corsican is the language of Corsica," a strict rebuff to much of the 
legislation around the French language's role in the state.  It was also a point of concern for 
many Corsicans with one stating, "It seems that the French Revolution ideals are completely 
falling apart."
86
Since coming to power in 2015, the nationalist government has been able to 
shift the cultural landscape of the island through grooming a sense of nationalistic pride for 
being Corsican over French.  The Times of Malta investigated the culture of the island in 
2018 to discover that there are small signs of nationalistic rebellion all over the island.  Both 
in the President of the Corsican Assembly's office and above the town halls of towns like 
Granace, the French Tricolour flag has been replaced by the black and white Moor's Head 
flag associated with traditional Corsican identity.  In one school visited by the Times of 
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Malta, children seem to be identifying more with a Corsican identity than either French, or 
both French and Corsican by a wide margin.  It was also at this school that the curriculum 
had started to include lessons in Corsican.
87
  
Soon after the Times of Malta arrived on the island, the President of France, Emmanuel 
Macron, visited the island.  The visit was greeted by protests over France's policy towards 
Corsica and the Corsican language in which the protesters numbered anywhere between six 
thousand to twenty-five thousand, making the president's visit to the island started on a tense 
note.
88
  Marcon's goals for the visit were to plea for unity between Corsica and the mainland, 
as well as pay tribute to Claude Érignac, a French Prefect on Corsica during the 1990s who 
was assassinated by a Corsican nationalist in 1998.  Macron both attempted to condemn the 
nationalism that had swept the politics of the island while also sitting down with nationalist 
leaders like Jean-Guy Talamoni.89  Before these talks with Macron, the leaders of the 
nationalist parties in Corsica told Reuters that the mainland was "playing with fire" if they 
planned on rejecting future requests for autonomy.  The big issues that they planned on 
speaking about were a blockage on property sales to non-Corsicans, which can be seen both 
in the context of the anti-Arab/immigrant rhetoric, which took hold in the 2015 protests, as 
well as an official status for the Corsican language. Gilles Simeoni, leader of Corsica's 
regional council and lawyer for the nationalist assassin who killed Claude Érignac was one of 
the leaders who meet with Macron and in a comment to Reuters that "'bombs are more 
efficient than votes' is something I do not agree with, but which at some point could be 
validated by a number of people."
90
  After his meeting with the Corsican Government, 
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Macron rejected their motion to have the Corsican language be recognized as an official 
language.
91
  
Right-Wing Groups 
The modern controversy around language is happening around the same time as the rise 
of Eurosceptic and far-right movements.  Far-right groups like National Front, now National 
Rally, have positioned themselves in the realm of language policy as strong supporters for the 
style of French language protectionism that has created the 1992 amendment.
92
  This has 
made them fairly opposed to the campaigners for regional minority language rights.  
However, the story is more complicated on the island of Corsica with the National Front’s 
rhetoric building on some of the Corsican separatist’s talking points that led to the 2015 riots.  
In the same election which swept the Corsican separatists into power the National Front was 
able to make gains.  In late December of 2015, Ajaccio, the capital of the tiny island region of 
France, erupted into protest.  The protests and riots focused their anger at Arab immigrants 
after two firefighters and a police officer were attacked in a low-income neighborhood.  The 
ensuing protests would result in an attack on a local mosque and mass protests against the 
Arab population.  In the aftermath of these protests, former UN mediation expert John Packer 
associated the protests with the wider independence/autonomy movement on the island with 
the anger at the Arab immigrants being a result of the growing nationalistic trends on the 
island.
93
  While Packer contends that the wider autonomy movement helped the National 
Front’s campaign built anti-immigrant sentiment that would lead to the 2015 riots, leaders of 
the Corsican nationalist movement disagree. After the protests and arson Jean-Guy Talamoni, 
president of the Corsican Assembly, stated that the anti-Arab movement was "totally 
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incompatible with our political tradition and culture."
94
    Going with this, the National Front 
has seen some real push back by Corsicans after the 2015 protests.  During the 2017 
presidential race, a National Front rally was attacked by a group of protestors who ended up 
“seriously injuring” a National Front member.  Jean-Guy Talamoni responded by tweeting 
support for the protestors.
95
 
Conclusion 
France as a whole has historically taken on a far more assimilationist set of policies 
towards language.  With a philosophical foundation that saw minority languages as a blocker 
of progress toward the spread of the revolutions ideas, minority languages were 
systematically removed from public life.  Like in Wales and around the world, resistance 
occurred to these policies. However, unlike many states, France did not budge on the primacy 
of French in the public sphere.  Pressure from the outside led to the 1992 amendment setting 
off a continuous struggle between regional language speakers and the French government.  In 
Corsica, where terrorism and violence had been commonplace since the 1970s, the new ways 
of debate on language seemed to heat up tensions.  This mixed in the mid-2000s with the 
anti-immigrant rhetoric of the far-right to create an environment that produced the 2015 and 
2017 protests.  The French linguistic policy has shown to be harsh and unproductive for 
speakers of minority languages.  It has caused them to feel isolated by their own nation, 
resorting to protest and in the case of Corsica, violent resistance.  
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Canada and Quebec 
This chapter will examine the case of Canada, with its strong language maintenance 
policies.  Those policies have provided important language rights to minority (French and 
indigenous) populations.  However, because of such strong maintenance policies at the 
federal level, these language rights have also become sites of political conflict and at the 
regional level inside of Quebec, a series of laws seeking to protect the regional language has 
turned the protective policies into something resembling France’s assimilationist policy, 
causing tension inside of the province.    
History of Linguistic policy 
Canada, outside of First Nations people, has two founding populations, English and 
French.  Both had settled the land in the 17
th
 century under the rule of their respective home 
nation. It was the United Kingdom who, in 1760, conquered the French colony of Quebec and 
put it and its French-speaking population under the control of an English-speaking merchant 
class who would hold control over the economy and politics of the colony.
96
  Canada started 
its road toward independence with the Constitution Act, 1867, which created the dominion of 
Canada, allowing for the establishment of a Canadian parliament. This continued with the 
Statute of Westminster 1931 and The British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949, and concluded 
with the Canada Act 1982, which officially ended the United Kingdom's ability to amend the 
Canadian constitution.  During this period, the internal struggle for French-language rights 
was raging as well.   
 The constitution that resulted from the Constitution Act, 1867 allowed for 
bilingualism in the Federal Parliament of Canada as well as the provincial Legislature of 
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Quebec.  This also expanded to rights for bilingual or French language trials in both federal 
and Quebec's courts.  However, no other province of Canada was made bilingual.  Most other 
provincial governments in Canada prohibited the use of the French language, as well as other 
minority languages such as those of the First Nations and the Germans.
97
  This bilingualism 
at the federal level was respected for the most part, with all federal publications being issued 
in French and English editions, and debate happened in both languages.
98
  The system of 
language rights from the start was different from many western states in that the French, as a 
regional minority language, was incorporated into the federal government and not just left to 
the provincial or local level.  A functional reason for this is that the French-speaking 
population of Canada currently is about twenty percent of the population while in other 
states, the regional minority speakers are a much lower percentage of the population (for 
example, Welsh speakers are only one percent of the United Kingdom's total population). 
 The set up from the 1867 constitution worked well for the French-speakers of Quebec 
with very little push back until almost a hundred years later in the 1970s.  Things changed 
during the so-called "Quiet Revolution," which pushed Quebec to heightened states of 
nationalism and desire to preserve the French language amongst Quebec’s general 
population.  Tensions from this rose in 1968 when in the Montreal neighborhood of Saint 
Léonard, French speakers, fearing that the new immigrant population, who sent their children 
to English medium schools, would turn their community into an English-speaking 
community.  This led to the broad requirement that all incoming elementary students be sent 
to French medium schools.  This resulted in massive protests on both sides.  Shortly after, 
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10,000 Francophone students demonstrated at McGill University demanding that the institute 
be turned into French medium institution.
99
  
    These protests resulted in a series of legislation towards language in the late 1960s, 
starting with Bill 63 (1969), which gave parents control over whether their child went to a 
French or English medium school.  The bill stood in strong support of the bilingual balance 
that Quebec had at the time; however, it was not the end of the debate.  Many French 
speakers felt the bill did not do enough to protect the French language, and thus 30,000 
French speakers went out after its passing to protests in Montreal and Quebec City.
100
   
 Shortly after, in 1974, Bill 22 was passed, which sought to protect the French 
language inside of Quebec even more by designating it as the province’s official language, 
forcing companies in the province to operate in French, as well as putting limits on who 
could enroll in English medium schools.  This bill was followed up in 1977 by Bill 101 (the 
Charter of the French Language), which furthered these provincial protections of the French 
language by forcing its use in many parts of the public sphere.  Bill 101 restricted the use of 
English on signage and drastically restricted the people who could enroll their children in 
English medium schools.  Bill 101 resulted in much tension from both protestors and outside 
observers, with the United Nations Human Rights Committee ruling in 1993 that the signage 
section of Bill 101 was an infringement on people's rights to expression inside of Quebec. 
Because of this, the law was changed in 1993 under Bill 86, so that English was allowed on 
signage as long as French text was twice as big as the English text on any commercial sign.
101
  
While a series of court cases since have lessened the effects of Bill 101 and Bill 22, the 
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legislation of the 1970s still heavily defines the linguistic policies of Quebec and the modern 
tension over the issue of language.
102
           
 Today, the national language policy of Canada at a federal level comes from the 1982 
constitution, which institutionalizes equality between English and French at the federal level 
of government.  The linguistic policy of the federal government is built around an attempt to 
de-territorialize languages by offering federal services in any official language across the 
nation, while also bringing both French and English bilingualism into the national discourse.  
The federal government funds a series of programs to support this federal bilingualism, such 
as the Official Languages Support Programs (OLSP), which produces community programs 
for the vitality of English and French in Canadian society.  These programs are funded 
through five-year plans titled The Action Plan for Official Languages, which is like a smaller-
scale version of Wales’s Cymraeg 2050, and serves as a guide for linguistic policy for the 
period.  These plans also have large allocated budgets with the plan to cover 2013-2018, 
having a budget of 1.1 billion USD.  On a federal level, there is a Commissioner of Official 
Languages whose job it is to make sure that all regulations around language rights are 
followed.  This is reminiscent of the Welsh language commissioner’s office in Wales, but on 
a federal level.   The Canadian government also has an official obligation to consult both the 
French and English communities before any changes to policy around language are made. 
Overall, the Canadian language policy sees itself as a product of compromise between 
English and French in an attempt to keep both populations happy and invested in Canada.
103
  
Because of this, the federal government has become explicitly bilingual while the provincial 
governments have been allowed to set their own policies.  While the federal government has 
created and funded a series of programs to support a bilingual Canada is has also given the 
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provinces the ability to set much of the linguistic policy related to how there provincial 
government runs.  This has allowed for the existence of a bilingual federal government 
looking over a collection of mainly unilingual provinces.      
 The modern policies put in place in Quebec take the protection of the French language 
much further than the promotion of bilingualism in the federal government.  However, with 
French being the already-established majority in the region of Quebec many of the policies 
act in a similar manner to France's assimilationist policies.  Many of these policies are listed 
below in the five categories outlined in chapter one.  
An Overview of the Modern Policies 
1. Names 
a. Businesses must under most conditions have and operate under a French name 
b. Signage must be primarily in French 
i. Signs can also use English along with French  
2. Communal Life  
a. Official Languages Support Programs (OLSP) 
3. Economic life 
a. Workers must be able to work in French 
b. Workers cannot be fired for refused for hiring because of a lack of English 
proficiency 
c. Businesses must be able to serve their customers in French  
d. Contracts must be made in French 
4. Governmental Responsibility 
i. Quebec courts do not have to have their decisions done in French, but 
they must be translated for anyone who requests into French free of 
charge.  
b. Government documents must be available in French  
5. Education 
a. Both French and English medium schools exist in Quebec  
i. French medium schools are the default 
ii. For a person to send their child to an English medium school, there are 
four main paths
104
 
1. Right under law 
a. a grouping of ways in which the English-speaking 
population was grandfathered into English medium 
education 
2. The child has a serious learning disability 
3. The child is experiencing serious family or humanitarian issues 
4. The child is in Quebec temporarily 
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Oslo Recommendations and Canada 
 
The current relationship between Canada’s linguistic policy and the Oslo 
recommendations is complex.  In the framework of the federal government, there is enough 
room for minority language rights both provided by the government and enough space for 
regional governments that wish can go into more detailed protections for languages specific 
to their region.  In Nunavut, the additional governmental serves offered in indigenous 
languages ae great examples of Oslo’s ideas around the duties of regional administrations for 
these types of regional minority languages.  However, in Quebec Canada's use of the Oslo 
recommendations becomes more and more lose.  Quebec’s restriction on signage, 
advertisements, and economic life are major policy areas that clash with the Oslo 
recommendations.  It is here in Quebec where the divergence from Oslo becomes the most 
apparent and it is where most of the Conflict related to language appears.         
Current Tensions  
Moving past the fervor of legislation and resulting tensions of the 1970s, Quebec 
faced two votes for independence: one in 1980 and another in 1995; both failed. The 1995 
campaign for leave heavily focused on the desire for a greater ability to protect their language 
from the encroaching use of English.  The vote ended up being drawn along linguistic lines 
with sixty percent of the French-speaking vote voting for independence while the non-
French-speaking population was viewed as the reason the referendum fail. Quebec's Premier, 
Jacques Parizeau, stated, "we were defeated by money and the ethnic vote," right after the 
vote failed, referring to the Anglophone and Allophone communities who voted massively in 
support of Quebec staying in Canada.
105
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Post referendums, the battle politically between Quebec's separatist and federalist 
forces continued.  In 2013, with a new nationalist government in Quebec, the linguistic 
tensions regained a primary focus in the province.  The government feared that the bilingual 
system at the federal level and French-focused bilingual system at the provincial level still 
did not do enough to protect the French language's continued existence.  Quebec’s minister, 
Jean-Francois Lisee, pointed to statistics such as "fifty percent of every new generation of 
French speakers from British Columbia to Ontario adopt English as a mother tongue," as the 
reasoning behind attempting to strengthen protections for the French language in Quebec and 
around Canada.
106
    
  A major push by his minority government party, Parti Québécois, was Bill 14, which 
would have added 155 amendments to the Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) to 
strengthen the status of the French language inside of Quebec. The bill would have required 
small businesses to shift all operations into French, stripped municipalities where English 
speakers were less than fifty percent of the population of their bilingual status, and among 
many other things gave the Quebec language inspector the right to search and seize records 
and files instantly in their investigations.
107
 
Bill 14, during its debate period, had massive effects on public consciousness.  
Protests in support of the bill sprung up in Montreal while English speakers began to speak 
out.
108
  A poll from the time showed that forty-two percent of English speakers were so 
unhappy with the local government and possible policy that they were considering leaving 
the province altogether.
109
 Mayors of many towns and cities also spoke out against the 
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proposed bill, because the proposed demographic cut off of what could be considered a 
bilingual municipality would lead to many of their districts losing that label and the support 
that came with it.
110
  Due to the pressure, Bill 14 was eventually removed from the policy 
agenda for the government, at least until the party could gain more control over the regional 
parliament.
111
 However, the tensions it exposed and promoted still remained in society. 
Tensions continued with both French and English speakers forming protests to the 
continued linguistic policy of the province.  One of these against the French language 
protections came in the form of the somewhat absurd, Pastagate.  The event that sprung the 
protests occurred when the Office Québécois de La Langue Française (OQLF) visited a 
Montreal restaurant and found that the restaurant had Italian-language words more prominent 
than French text and with the restriction that at least half the text on menus need be in French, 
the restaurant was handed judgment.  This came in the form of demands that the restaurant 
change many of the words of Italian nature on the menu to French ones; this included the 
term pasta.
112
  The incident led to massive outcries amongst the public, who saw the office as 
overbearing.  It resulted in a media firestorm with around 350 articles in fourteen countries 
covering the controversy and a series of other businesses coming forward with stories of 
abusive behavior by the OQLF.  As a result, the head of the OQLF resigned soon after, and a 
restructuring of how language complaints are handled by the office went into effect.
113
  They 
also changed the policy towards menus allowing for the use of foreign words as the names of 
dishes.
114
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Tensions between French and English speakers existed past the institutional level with 
a famous example that received much press where a French-speaking paramedic refused to 
use English when talking to the parents of a two-year-old he was attempting to care for.  The 
confrontation between the paramedics and parents resulted in another media storm and an 
internal investigation into the incident.
115
  Interpersonal confrontations around the topic of 
language have also appeared to be common between French-language staff of public transit 
and English language passengers.
116
 The city of Montreal, the biggest in Quebec, has been 
described as still having a lingering "Berlin Wall of the mind" between the English and 
French speakers.
117
  
The tensions continued to manifest in policy, however, which never reached the 
material effects of those bills passed in the 70s.  Some of these new policies focused on very 
small and petty things, such as a non-enforceable decree that business must greet all 
customers with a "bonjour." This new decree led to even more push back from business 
owners.
118
 The party behind policies, Parti Québécois, saw a drastic drop in its support since 
the debacle of Bill 14 back in 2013.  The party has dropped from minority government to 
official opposition in the 2014 election, to a third party in the Quebec parliament in the 2018 
election.  The party saw a drop from 54 of 125 seats to 10 of 125 seats in the Quebec 
parliament from 2012 to 2018. However, this trend seems to be in reverse at a federal level 
with the nationalistic Bloc Québécois party winning 32 seats in the Canadian house of 
commons during the 2019 election, making it the third-largest party in that chamber. New 
York Times' Canada correspondent, Dan Bilefsky, associated at least some of the party's 
success to the French-speaking population's desires to protect the use of the French 
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language.
119
 On the Bloc Québécois website, it is explicitly stated that they stand against the 
concept of multiculturalism and in favor of Bill 101 and the "solidarity" that comes with a 
single language, in this case, French.
120
  This part on their website also posts grievances 
against the Canadian Supreme Court's weakening of Bill 101 as a reason that the people of 
Quebec must continue to fight to preserve their culture and language.
121
   
The tensions of bilingualism exist in many of the provinces outside of Quebec as well.  
Debates and protests over the funding for many of the French language programs have been 
seen in provinces such as Ontario.  In 2018, French-speaking Ottawans protested in Ontario 
over budget cuts Premier Doug Ford had made to French language services.  The following 
year, the French language groups pressured the government of the province into securing 
funding for a previously scrapped French medium university in the province.
122
    
The politics of Canada's official bilingualism also have major effects on the political 
power balance outside of Quebec.  Columnist JJ McCullough has written extensively on how 
Canada's bilingual requirements for high-up officials have led to a serious shift in power 
towards Quebec and the bilingual minority.  His basic argument is based on the idea that 
these people have a very difficult to near impossible time learning a language if that language 
is not necessary to their existence.  It goes on to posit that most Canadians outside of Quebec, 
New Brunswick, or any province without a large French population, would have no real 
reason to learn French and thus will not learn French.
123
 Adding to that, Canadian policy 
makes around forty percent of federal government positions require knowledge of both 
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English and French.
124
 This means that a large portion of the population that is concentrated 
outside of Quebec is unable to work in parts of the federal government due to the structural 
barrier of having to learn another language.  McCullough continues this by pointing out the 
issues in structurally removing people both geographically and class-wise from participating 
in many roles in the federal government through this language requirement. He sees the 
federal bilingualism as something that has moved beyond a practical way to incorporate 
Quebec into participating in the nation, but into something that is stratifying society,
125
going 
so far to claim that the level of linguistic stratification has "turned Canada's rulers into a 
linguistic aristocracy."
126
  The over-representation of people whose first official language is 
French is shown in government diversity statistics that state in all Federal positions about 
29.1% indicated their first official language was French.  This is furthered when looking at 
executive positions in the federal government where 32.3% of positions are held by people 
whose first official language was French.
127
  This all compared the only 22% of people in 
Canada whose first language is French.
128
  The structural barriers that exist for people 
seeking federal positions add an additional level of concern for McCullough when 
considering political representation.  He sees the bilingual requirements for positions like 
Prime Minister as shifting power away from western Canada and towards the parties having 
to choose leaders from this "bilingual aristocracy" and making winning political campaigns 
have a focus on the politics of Quebec.
129
   
                                                          
124
 “Official Languages Act.” OCOL, 28 Oct. 2013. 
125
 McCullough, J.J. “‘Let Them Learn French’: Canada's Bilingual Elite Hold All the Power.” HuffPost Canada, 
HuffPost Canada, 17 May 2014.  
126
 McCullough, J.J. “J. J. McCullough: Bilingualism Is the Demand of Canada's Linguistic Aristocracy.” National 
Post, 4 Aug. 2015. 
127
 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. “Government of Canada.” Canada.ca, Government of Canada, 29 
May 2019. 
128
 “The World Factbook: Canada.” Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 Feb. 2018. 
129
 McCullough, J.J. “Opinion | Canada's French-English Bilingualism Is Bad Policy - and Worse Politics.” The 
Washington Post, WP Company, 24 Jan. 2020. 
 Brant 56 
 
Canada's bilingual policy also presents issues when considering that French and 
English are not the only languages widely spoken in the nation. Both immigrant and native 
languages lack an official status from the federal government.  This, in effect, means that for 
the bilingual required jobs, many indigenous and immigrant people would have to be 
trilingual to qualify. For many indigenous communities, they have made major strides in 
promoting native language education in local communities.
130
  In the territory of Nunavut, 
where Inuit people make up a majority of the population, regional autonomy has allowed for 
Inuktitut and Inuinnaqtun to gain wide use in government, becoming de facto official 
languages with the Northwest Territories recognizing ten indigenous languages as official 
languages next to English and French.
131
  However, federal policy up until 2019 did not 
discuss aboriginal languages in its policy, territorializing the languages and services for those 
languages in the regions which provide local support for them.
132
  In 2019 the liberal 
government passed Bill C-91, the Indigenous Languages Act, which while finally giving 
some recognition to indigenous languages falls short of demands from many indigenous 
groups.  The bill gives some federal recognition (still not official language status) and 
protections only in some areas of the country and in those areas the protections given still fall 
short of what is provided already at the regional level.  A major issue is that federal services 
operating in the Inuit communities still are not required to be able to communicate in the 
widely used Inuit languages, only French and English.
133
     
The question of immigrant languages also becomes relevant in the federal restrictions 
on jobs to bilingual applicants.  Many immigrants and first-generation Canadians who come 
from non-English or French backgrounds face the challenge of learning two languages before 
                                                          
130
 Fettes, Mark. “Is the Language Tide Turning in Canada?” Cultural Survival Quarterly Magazine, June 1993. 
131
 Cardinal, Linda. “Central Elements of Language Policy in Canada.” Compendium of Language Management 
in Canada (CLMC), UOttawa, 2019. 
132
 Fettes, Mark. “Is the Language Tide Turning in Canada?” Cultural Survival Quarterly Magazine, June 1993. 
133
 Nunatsiaq News. “Inuit Org Slams Recently Passed Federal Indigenous Languages Bill.” Nunatsiaq News, 26 
June 2019. 
 Brant 57 
 
being able to work in the large chunk of federal positions that requires bilingualism. For 
many communities in Canada, immigrant languages such a Punjabi and Mandarin are much 
more widely spoken than French.  Changing demographics in the nation have many a variety 
of other languages relevant to federal policy, with many in the growing multicultural centers 
of Canada starting to question why these newer languages are not part of official language 
policy.
134
 
Conclusion  
Canada has faced a far more daunting problem with regional linguistic rights than the 
other two case studies as the French-speaking population makes up a much larger percentage 
of the population than the Welsh or Corsicans ever did.  Due to this, the policy for French-
language protection has had to be extended to a federal level, and French has received the 
most positive protections at a regional level of any of the case studies.  While this has led to 
some real tensions inside of Quebec and the political institutions of Canada, they have also 
achieved the goal of keeping Quebec invested in Canada.  While through this Canada has 
been able to avoid the high levels of tension and conflict seen in a nation like France the 
national maintenance policy mixed with the assimilationist policies of Quebec has led to 
more tension than the United Kingdom.  The policies also remain popular with the peoples of 
Canada.  Seventy-two percent of Canadians support the bilingualism, while the province with 
the lowest support, Alberta, still having a sixty percent approval for it.
135
 Canada and Quebec 
will probably continue to face tensions around the bilingual policy; however, the nation 
seems still compelled to continue it.  
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Conclusion  
Language serves a few very different roles.  The first is one of function, it is a tool of 
communication, and from this sprouts a utilitarian desire to use a common tongue to break 
down barriers between disparate people.  The second is that of a living framework for culture, 
a fundamental piece of a group's identity, and it is through this that we desire to preserve the 
languages of the world. The third builds on the second by providing a proxy for cultural 
conflicts and enshrining borders between the in and out-groups. These ideas around language 
have produced two separate versions of policy around language, maintenance, and 
assimilationist. 
Summery around the different policy types 
Maintenance policies in language are primarily made up of governments taking 
positive actions to promote continued use or renewal of a language.  The rights that come out 
of maintenance policies are generally more positive, with government allocation of funds of 
education or cultural events.  These policies can provide rights that can be viewed in some 
contexts as collective as their goal is to protect that language of a specific group, and for this, 
that group as a whole may need rights for the language.  Many of these policies then tend to 
tie protections of the language in questions with protection for the minority group itself.  It is 
in the context of a maintenance policy that language is more than a function of 
communication but also an extension of culture and that the continued use of the language is 
instrumental in the continued uniqueness of the cultural group in question. 
Maintenance policies to the extreme can see the push for minority languages to take 
on the form of extreme protections.  While the goal of maintenance policies is the support for 
minority language speakers and continued use, when the policies reach a point where to do 
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this would mean eliminating the rights of other languages’ speakers,conflict can occur.  In 
Wales, the idea of closing off communities to non-speakers of the minority language in order 
to make sure the communities make up remains concentrated with enough of the minority 
language's speakers so that the language remains relevant and living, while built around 
trying to preserve the Welsh languages use in northern Wales, still produced significant 
conflict and backlash from many English speakers in the region.  Policies built to preserve 
minority languages at an extreme can be a significant driver of conflict and tension between 
speakers and non-speaker of a minority language when the perception of the policies make 
the minority language speakers are gaining preferential treatment in the system.  This is 
especially apparent at the local level with maintenance polices having to distribute limited 
resources such as the school’s medium of education, as discussed in the chapter on the United 
Kingdom and Wales.  Maintenance policies at the Federal level can also be drivers of conflict 
such is the case in Canada where the drive for bilingualism has produced barriers for 
monolingual speakers as well as speakers of minority languages not covered in federal policy, 
such as those of the Inuit.       
Assimilationist policies are those that seek to discourage the use of particular 
languages in the promotion of a single official state language. These policies tend to spring 
from the idea that language exists as purely a function of communication, detached from a 
cultural significance to a group, or as an acknowledgment that a particular cultural group in 
the state needs to be brought closer to the mainstream culture of that state.  Most language 
polices in the past have been assimilationist, trying to unify disparate people into one united 
nation. In modern times, however, there has been a shift towards having language policies 
that are better respect the rights of minority language groups.  Even in states that have 
traditionally held strong assimilationist policy sets, there has been a movement to give 
services and support to the languages of minorities.   
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Assimilationist policies can cause significant amounts of conflict as they attempt to 
eliminate the use of a minority language in a nation or region by promoting or only allowing 
for the use of an official language. In places like Corsica, hard assimilationist policies were a 
contributing factor for Corsican speakers rising up for resistance against the mainland French 
government through groups like the National Liberation Front of Corsica.    
Federal vs. Regional policy 
To best understand the impact of language policy on political conflict, it is important to 
understand policy at both the federal and regional levels.  Strong maintenance policies try and 
bring the positive protections of the minority language to the federal level in an effort to de-
territorialize the language.  More mild polices will see positive protections for minority 
languages only in the areas that those minorities primarily live, thus keeping the minority 
language territorialized.  These mild policies could also see federal support for a single or low 
level of national languages in order to provide a primary medium for the various peoples of 
the nation to communicate.  This, however, still can cause conflict through completely 
disregarding the rights of minority speakers outside of their specified region.  
It is important to understand that some national minority languages are actually the 
dominant language within a particular region.  Languages like Welsh are both minorities in 
the overall scope of the state but also in the region there are concentrated while languages 
like French are minorities in the national scale of Canada, however, are majorities in the 
region they are concentrated in.  With languages that are minorities in the region, they are 
concentrated in having protections to increase the speakership of the language being seen as 
an important part of maintenance policy; this can be seen in Wales. However, if the language 
is a majority in the region but a minority nationally, the pushes federal and federally 
supported maintenance policies for that language in the region to function almost as 
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assimilationist policies, like in Quebec with French.  The use of policies meant to preserve 
minority languages uses in a region for a language that, while nationally is a minority but 
regionally is the majority can lead again to many of the serious tensions presented in the 
Canada case study.  
Both Quebec and France used similar language around the reasoning for their modern 
pushes to protect the French language in their respective territories.  In France, the push to 
solidify French's role as the sole official language for the state came after the rise of English 
as a global language for business, and there were fears that French would become displaced 
inside of its own nation.  Quebec, while it is a French majority province, exists in an English 
majority nation.  Because of this, many policies that Quebec has created are in the view that 
they are a minority in the national sense. In this view, English speakers who make up a 
minority in the province in the context that they are the majority in the nation.  This 
motivation for some of the new assimilationist policies is different from the original 
utilitarian nature of many original assimilationist policies. France's original view that a single 
language for the state would be key in spreading the ideals of the French Revolution has been 
supplanted by a desire to keep French as the language of the public in a globalized world.  
The question of the new role assimilationist linguistic policies may play as a response to the 
globalized world would be an important extension to this work.    
Overview of case studies 
Wales 
The United Kingdom historically has had a policy of assimilating its variety of 
peoples into speaking English.  However, through the process of devolution and the handing 
of powers to the different countries inside the nation, speakers of regional minority languages 
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have been able to collect new protections for and promotions of their language. In the case of 
Wales, the protection and promotion of the Welsh language was a priority of many Welsh, a 
priority that became a priority for the Welsh assembly and government during devolution.  
Various measures to promote Welsh in schools, businesses, and community life have resulted 
in a rise in the number of Welsh language speakers.  However, with these policies, there have 
been resulting local tensions with English speakers in some parts of the country over the 
medium of language for public schools.  These tensions, however, are still far less 
widespread than the initial protests by Cymdeithas yr Iaith during their push for recognition 
and protections for Welsh.  In Wales, the move for more rights and protection of the language 
has lowered the tensions overall.   
France 
France from the French revolution has seen a common language for the state as key to 
the unity and function of the state. Because of this, there have been massive pushes to use 
assimilationist policies to make regional minority language speaking groups speak French.  
These pressures have recently both increased and come under question with France’s assent 
into the European Union.  Fearing the rise of English in society, France declared French the 
national language in the constitution and doubled down on many policies that put the French 
language as the only medium of communication in the state.  Many regional groups 
responded to this with mass protests, attempting to get French to ratify the European Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages.  On the Island of Corsica, violent resistance to the 
French lasted until 2014 with one of their main goals, even after laying down their arms, 
being the protection of the Corsican language.     
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Canada 
Canada stands as a case study with the most pro- maintenance policy towards its most 
prevalent minority language: French.  Canada is the only case study where its language 
policy attempts to support its regional minority language outside of the contexts of the 
languages region.  The federal support for bilingualism has attempted to give the French 
language a de-territorialization.  However, Canada has not been as supportive of other 
regional minority languages, with the main being the various languages of the country's First 
Nation and Inuit languages, which, while receiving support at a local and regional level, are 
not even mentioned in federal policy.  The level of support for the regional language of 
French has also come in the form of allowing for the Quebec government to take drastic steps 
to shift the language policy of their province to resemble that of a more assimilationist 
framework in the name of protecting their language.  The policy of Canada has formed a 
paradox of positive protections and a push for de-territorialized bilingualism at the federal 
level, but at the provincial level inside the region, which hosts the minority language in 
question, there is a policy of either reluctant bilingualism or just straight forward 
assimilationist policy.  This paradox has caused conflict both at the federal level with 
tensions over the distribution of power that has resulted from the attempts to foster a bilingual 
culture in Canada, and at the provincial level inside of Quebec with many Anglophones or 
Allophones living in Quebec feeling there being squeezed out the province.   
Overall relationship with Oslo 
Of all the states, the United Kingdom followed the Oslo recommendations the most.  
Taking the approach of supporting the cultural aspects of its minority languages while also 
providing legal administrative services in the minority language in regions with 
concentrations of the speakers has allowed for the United Kingdom to make great strides in 
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its promotion and protection of the Welsh language. The other two case studies have more 
shaky policies in comparison to the Oslo recommendations.  Canada, with its federal 
bilingualism, gives a lot of positive protections for its main two languages but, in many 
regional locations, misses the mark of Oslo.  Inside of Quebec, there are various divergences 
from Oslo in the name of preserving the French language.  Notable differentiations revolve 
around regulations on signage and business operations, which would push the use of French 
over English or other present languages.  In France, the Oslo recommendations are very much 
ignored.  Rules on signage, business operations and court operations all strictly enforce the 
use of French, very little is given to minority languages in support of their use even at the 
regional or local level.   
By looking at the three case studies presented in this thesis, it would look like the Oslo 
recommendations and their ideas around linguistic rights are effective in the reduction of 
conflict.  The promotion of minority languages at a regional language through positive 
actions such as with cultural events and for allowing for freedoms around allowing people to 
use the language they wish in business, has shown to be effective in places like the United 
Kingdom.  In places like France where there protections and promotions do not occur conflict 
remains high.          
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Comparison of policy and conflict chart 
Nation Central 
Government 
Policy 
Regional 
Policy 
Types of 
Conflict present 
Level of 
perceived 
conflict 
Difference 
from Oslo 
Canada Maintenance Assimilationist Political 
tensions and 
protests 
nationally 
Medium Middle 
France Assimilationist Assimilationist High levels of 
protests 
nationally, 
some violent 
conflict at the 
regional level  
High High 
United 
Kingdom  
Soft 
Maintenance 
Maintenance Protests and 
political 
tensions 
regionally 
Low Low 
 
 
Concluding remarks  
Conflict over language in the developed world still exists.  In the three case studies shown 
through their level of protection for their minority languages has been a determinant in the 
level of conflict that the nation has seen.  France, reluctant to give any leeway to its minority 
languages, has led to massive protests and even some violent confrontations on the island of 
Corsica.  Its policy of assimilation towards minority languages has led to the most material 
conflict of any of the states in question.  Canada, with its policy of federal bilingualism mixed 
with Quebec's assimilationist protections of French, has also produced conflict and tensions 
in a variety of ways.  On the ground in Quebec, tensions around the assimilationist policies 
for the French language have led to many non-French speakers feeling unwelcome in this 
system.  The conflicts in Canada also are extended to the federal level, where the bilingual 
system has created some imbalances in the political system as well as the distribution of 
federal jobs.  In the United Kingdom, a policy of letting the local governments set language 
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policy has allowed for lack of real conflict over the language at the federal level.  It has also 
allowed for the different counties inside of the United Kingdom to handle local language 
rights groups' demands in meaningful ways.  In Wales, the Welsh assembly was able to 
greatly reduce the number of protests and conflicts around the topic of language but still has 
struggled to find the right balance in the distribution of resources for the promotion and 
protection of the Welsh language. 
The United Kingdom’s handling of Welsh has produced the least amount of modern 
conflict and avoiding much of anything at a national level has been possibly the best way to 
limit tensions.  France with its policy of assimilation has led to the most conflict and makes a 
good case for the importance of linguistic rights in the reduction of conflict.  Canada, as 
presented, shows the issues with both bringing a strong maintenance policy into the federal 
system for one language while allowing for individual regions to not hold the same bilingual 
principals in there governing.       
Limitations  
One of the major faults in the study lies in the very nature of language, in that it is an 
extension of culture, and so any conflicts over language are generally part of a much larger 
cultural conflict.  Many other factors caused the violence that was described in Corsica, and 
in the other case studies, the problems around language are again extensions of larger cultural 
issues.  These other cultural factors are important to the understanding of these conflicts and 
the way linguistic policy is formed.  This study misses a lot of the additional context as it 
tries to present only the most relevant information; however, the tangential cultural context 
would be something to go further into to understand the conflicts presented here truly.   
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Another limitation rests on the concept of how we describe a language as a minority.  
Thought this study, languages that have been described as minorities are described as such in 
the context of a nation as a whole; however, this can cause issues with looking at the 
differences between these minority languages and even some majority languages.  French in 
Quebec and Welsh in Wales are both minority languages in the context of the nation as a 
whole.  In the context of the region in which both of these respective languages are found; 
however, Welsh speakers are still a minority, while French speakers make up a majority in 
Quebec.  Dividing this down even further, do Welsh speakers in rural north Wales still count 
as a minority even though they may make up a majority of their hamlet.  Expanding out 
France used many of their assimilationist policies for protection against the global language 
of English that it saw its own language of France as vulnerable to.  Expanding the ideas 
around what counts as a minority language in a globalized world and how policies and our 
view of these policies shift based on which level we view these languages is a serious 
dimension to this.  It is a dimension in which further study would greatly be helped by 
looking at.        
Further study 
Further study into this subject would be greatly helped by looking more into the question 
of when a linguistic group has the right to use protectionary assimilationist policies like what 
happened in France and Quebec.  The world is moving in a globalized direction where 
pressures for peoples to learn a global language are becoming more intense.  When I traveled 
to Iceland in the summer of 2018, every single person I came across spoke English.  The 
pressures mounting on states to adopt Global languages like English are real and have 
material effects on the languages spoken in many states.  Widening the framework to look at 
linguistic policy from a more global perspective would allow for one to study the effect of 
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this pressure on states' policy towards there official language as well as their minority 
languages.  In the case of states like France, these pressures have translated into doubling 
down on trying to promote French lead too much of the conflict described in that chapter.    
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